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Cloud Engineering Academy
5. Security for Banking & Finance

Module 5 cheat sheet

One-page revision summary for Security for Banking & Finance: services, Azure mapping, CLI commands, limits, decision rules, exam traps and cost traps.

SCS-C03SAA-C03DVA-C03CLF-C02

Assumes: AWS CLI v2 · AWS SDK for .NET v4 · Region us-east-1 · facts as stated in the Module 5 lessons; items marked VERIFY there are not repeated as certain here. Verified against official sources on 2026-11-18.

A printable summary of Module 5. Each row links back to the lesson with the detail. This is revision help, not compliance advice: your QSA, auditor and counsel decide.

Key services

ServiceWhat it is for
IAM, STS, Identity CenterIdentities, policies and short-lived credentials; humans sign in through Identity Center
Organizations SCPs / RCPsGuardrails that cap permissions on principals (SCP) or resources (RCP); they never grant
IAM Access AnalyzerExternal-access and unused-access findings, policy generation and checks
KMS / CloudHSMManaged keys with key policies and envelope encryption / single-tenant HSMs and custom key stores
Secrets Manager / Parameter StoreRotating secrets / cheap configuration and SecureString
ACM / Private CAFree auto-renewing public certificates / private PKI for mTLS
S3 Block Public Access, Object Lock, MacieStop public exposure, WORM retention, PII discovery
Network Firewall, WAF, Shield, Verified AccessEgress filtering, layer-7 rules and rate limits, DDoS protection, identity-aware access
CloudTrail, ConfigWho did what (log archive with integrity validation) / what the resource looks like and rules over it
Security Hub, GuardDuty, Inspector, DetectiveAggregated findings, threat detection, vulnerability scanning, investigation
AWS Backup (Vault Lock)Immutable, cross-account backup copies

.NET / Azure → AWS

Microsoft / AzureAWS
Entra ID + PIMIAM Identity Center + permission sets, temporary role sessions
Azure RBACIAM identity and resource policies, permission boundaries
Azure Policy (deny)SCPs and RCPs
Managed identityIAM role for ECS task, Lambda or EC2
Key Vault keys / Managed HSMKMS / CloudHSM
Key Vault secretsSecrets Manager (+ Parameter Store)
Azure Storage immutabilityS3 Object Lock, Backup Vault Lock
Defender for CloudSecurity Hub, GuardDuty, Inspector
PurviewMacie
Activity LogCloudTrail
SentinelSecurity Hub + Detective + CloudWatch, or your SIEM
.NET DataProtection / AesGcmKMS GenerateDataKey + local AES-GCM (envelope encryption)

Most useful CLI commands

TaskCommand
Who am I?aws sts get-caller-identity --profile learn-sandbox
Test a policy offlineaws iam simulate-custom-policy ... · aws iam simulate-principal-policy ...
Validate a policyaws accessanalyzer validate-policy --policy-type IDENTITY_POLICY --policy-document file://p.json
Create / inspect a keyaws kms create-key · aws kms describe-key --key-id ID · aws kms get-key-policy --key-id ID --policy-name default
Rotationaws kms enable-key-rotation --key-id ID · aws kms get-key-rotation-status --key-id ID
Retire a lab keyaws kms schedule-key-deletion --key-id ID --pending-window-in-days 7
Verify CloudTrail logsaws cloudtrail validate-logs --trail-arn ARN --start-time TIME
Config complianceaws configservice describe-compliance-by-config-rule
Inspector findingsaws inspector2 list-findings
Read a secret valueaws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id NAME
Offline policy linter (this module)dotnet run --project src/Harbourline.Security.PolicyLinter -- lint policy.json

Key limits and defaults

ItemValueLesson
Managed policy size6,144 characters; inline policies per role together 10,240IAM in depth
Role trust policy2,048 characters by default (adjustable to 8,192)IAM in depth
Role session15 minutes to 12 hours; role chaining capped at 1 hourIdentity Center, MFA and STS
Permission set session1 to 12 hours, default 1 hourIdentity Center, MFA and STS
SCPs / RCPsDo not affect the management accountBoundaries, SCPs, RCPs
KMS Encrypt4 KB maximum plaintext; use envelope encryptionAWS KMS
KMS key deletionWaiting period 7 to 30 days (default 30); irreversible afterwardsAWS KMS
KMS automatic rotationPeriod 90 to 2,560 days, default 365; key ID unchangedBackup security and key rotation
KMS costUSD 1 per key per month, prorated hourly; none while pending deletionAWS KMS
Secrets Manager recovery window7 to 30 days; USD 0.40 per secret per monthSecrets Manager
Parameter Store value sizeStandard 4 KB, advanced 8 KBSecrets Manager
ACM public certificate validity198 days, auto-renewed when DNS validation stays in placeCertificates, TLS, mTLS
CloudTrail event history90 days of management events, free, not extendableCloudTrail for banks
CloudTrail digestsHourly, SHA-256 hash chain, signedCloudTrail for banks
WAF capacityUp to 5,000 WCUs per web ACL; extra charge above 1,500WAF and Shield
Vault Lock compliance grace timeMinimum 3 days, then immutableBackup security and key rotation
GuardDuty trial30 days per account per RegionSecurity Hub, GuardDuty, Inspector, Detective

Decision rules

If…Then…
A human needs AWS accessIdentity Center and a role session, never an IAM user with keys
Two policies conflictExplicit deny wins; then check boundaries, SCPs/RCPs and session policies cap the allow
Delegating role creation to developersPermission boundary plus a rule that new roles must carry it
Stop a whole account or OU from an actionSCP; to stop outsiders reaching your resources, RCP
Data larger than 4 KBEnvelope encryption with GenerateDataKey
Regulation needs single-tenant HSMs or key custodyCloudHSM or a custom key store; otherwise plain KMS
Credentials in code or configSecrets Manager with rotation; Parameter Store for non-secret or cheap config
Service-to-service identity inside the platformmTLS with Private CA or IAM roles
Logs must survive an admin compromiseOrganisation trail into a separate log-archive account, Object Lock, integrity validation
Detecting threatsGuardDuty; aggregate in Security Hub; investigate in Detective
Records must not change for a retention periodObject Lock (governance in labs, compliance only deliberately)
Leaked access keyDeactivate, review CloudTrail, rotate, then follow the runbook

Common exam traps

  • Explicit deny beats any allow, but an SCP or boundary allow alone grants nothing.
  • Cross-account access needs both sides (identity policy and resource policy); within one account a resource policy can grant on its own.
  • Role chaining caps the session at 1 hour, whatever the role's maximum says.
  • KMS key policy is the primary control: without the key policy (or an IAM-enabling statement) IAM alone cannot grant access.
  • Rotation keeps the key ID and old material; asymmetric, HMAC and custom-key-store keys are rotated manually with an alias.
  • Object Lock compliance mode and Vault Lock compliance mode cannot be shortened, even by root.
  • CloudTrail event history is 90 days; a trail is needed for longer retention.
  • Security Hub CSPM is the original posture service; the newer Security Hub is separate.
  • Macie finds PII in S3 only; it does not prevent exposure.
  • Shield Standard is automatic and free; Shield Advanced is a paid commitment.

Cost traps

TrapAvoid it by
CloudHSM clusters left runningHourly per HSM; design-only exercise, delete the same day
Shield AdvancedUSD 3,000 per month with a 1-year commitment; design-only
AWS Private CACosts USD 400 per month for a general-purpose CA; use a local OpenSSL CA for the mTLS lab
KMS keys and rotationsSchedule deletion after labs; the first two rotations each add USD 1 per month
Secrets Manager secretsUSD 0.40 each per month; Parameter Store for most labs
Network Firewall, NAT, interface endpointsHourly per AZ plus per GB; tear down the same day
Verified Access applicationsUSD 0.27 per application per hour, even idle
GuardDuty, Inspector, Macie, Detective trialsNote the date, disable in the same Region, check Billing next day
Config recorders everywhereRecord only the resource types you need; delete rules and recorder after the lab
Backups copied everywhere, foreverLifecycle rules; governance mode and short retention in labs

Encryption, classification and tokenisation (lessons 12 and 14)

TopicRule of thumbLesson
Three layersTLS in transit, service encryption at rest, field-level encryption in the application; each stops different threatsEncryption at rest and in transit
Creation-only settingsRDS and EBS encryption cannot be switched on in place: snapshot, copy encrypted, restoreEncryption at rest and in transit
Key ownershipAWS owned (invisible) < AWS managed (visible, fixed policy) < customer managed (your policy and audit)Encryption at rest and in transit
TLS policy in IaCAlways set SslPolicy explicitly; the IaC default allows TLS 1.0Certificates, TLS and mTLS
Random vs deterministicRandom by default; deterministic leaks equality and frequency; random plus a keyed blind index for searchEncryption at rest and in transit
Encryption contextIdentifiers only (it is plain text in CloudTrail); verify it on decryptEncryption at rest and in transit
ClassificationA label is worth only the controls attached to it; fail the build on unlabelled propertiesData classification, masking and tokenisation
Masking vs tokenisationMasking is display only; tokenisation keeps the real value in one vaultData classification, masking and tokenisation
MacieS3 only; produces evidence of misclassification, people fix the label (⚠ VERIFY current availability)Data classification, masking and tokenisation

Extra exam traps: a snapshot encrypted with an AWS managed key cannot be shared cross-account; pseudonymised data is still personal data; a plain hash of a card number is brute-forceable.

Independent learning resource — not affiliated with, endorsed or sponsored by Amazon Web Services. AWS and related marks are trademarks of Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All banking data in examples is fictional. Sample architectures are for learning and are not automatically compliant with GDPR, PCI DSS or any banking regulation.

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