AWS Organizations structure: OUs, the management account and policy inheritance
Design an OU tree for a bank, keep the management account nearly empty, attach policies so they inherit correctly, and check the whole design with a tested validator before you touch a real organisation.
Assumes: .NET 10 LTS · AWS SDK for .NET v4 (AWSSDK.Organizations 4.1.x) · AWS CLI v2 · Terraform 1.14 / AWS provider v6 · Region us-east-1. Verified against official sources on 2026-11-18.
Learning objectives
By the end of this lesson you can:
- Design an OU tree (Security, Infrastructure, Workloads, Sandbox, Suspended) and defend each OU by the policy and ownership differences it expresses, not by the org chart.
- Explain the management account's limited role and list the few things that must still happen there.
- Predict which policies reach an account through inheritance, and why attaching a policy to the root is the most dangerous move.
- Create OUs and accounts, and move accounts between OUs, with the console, CLI, SDK and Terraform.
- Use trusted access and delegated administrators so that day-to-day security work does not happen in the management account.
- Run a tested validator (
hl-org) that checks an organisation design against Harbourline's rules before it is applied.
Prerequisites
- Why a bank uses many AWS accounts: the reasons behind each OU.
- AWS accounts and Organizations: the vocabulary and the table of policy types. This lesson does not repeat it.
- Secure your AWS account: you already have an organisation with a Sandbox OU.
- Tools: AWS CLI v2 with
learn-management, optional .NET 10 SDK (or Docker) for the validator, optional Terraform 1.10+.
Why this matters in banking
An organisation structure is the first thing an auditor asks to see, and the thing that is hardest to fix later. If the tree mirrors the org chart ("Retail", "Corporate", "IT"), every reorganisation forces account moves, and every move changes which policies apply, silently. If production accounts sit directly under the root, the only way to apply a production-only rule is to attach it to the whole organisation. If the management account also runs a "small" reporting job, an engineer who needs access to that job gets access to the controls of every account.
The structure decides three things for the next ten years: which guardrails can be targeted precisely, who can administer what, and how fast a new account becomes safe. Get it right once, write it down as code, and review it like code.
The idea in plain language
AWS Organizations is a tree. At the top is one root. Below it are organisational units (OUs), which are folders, and accounts, which are the leaves. You can nest OUs up to five levels deep, but you almost never should. Policies are attached to a node, and everything below the node inherits them.
The one account that created the organisation is the management account. It pays the bill and administers the tree. It is special in three ways:
- It sits at the root and cannot be moved into an OU. (Everything else should be in an OU.)
- SCPs and RCPs do not restrict it. That is why nothing but organisation administration belongs there.
- A few actions can only be performed from it, such as creating the organisation itself, closing the organisation, and (unless delegated) managing most organisation-wide services.
Analogy: a holding company with divisions. The holding company's head office (management account) signs the group's cheques and writes group policy, but its staff do not run branches. Divisions (OUs) group branches (accounts) that need the same rules: the Security division holds the records room and the fraud-watch office, Workloads holds the businesses, Sandbox is the innovation lab with a small budget, and Suspended is the sealed building for anything shut down.
Design OUs for policy, not for people
An OU should exist because its accounts need different policies, permissions or owners than their siblings. AWS's own guidance on organising environments follows the same idea: group by function and by the rules that apply, and keep the tree shallow.
| OU | Holds | Why it is separate (what policy differs) |
|---|---|---|
| Security | log-archive, security-tooling | Strictest SCPs; workload engineers have no access; audit read-only roles |
| Infrastructure | network-hub, shared-services | Platform team ownership; shared networking and CI/CD; no customer data |
| Workloads / Prod | Production accounts | Deny changes outside the deployment role; no human write access in normal operation |
| Workloads / NonProd | Dev and test accounts | Same baseline guardrails, looser human access |
| Sandbox | Personal and experimental accounts | Region limit, instance-size limits, no commitments, small budgets, no route to production |
| Suspended | Accounts being closed or quarantined | A deny-all SCP freezes them while evidence is kept |
| Policy Staging (optional) | Test accounts | New SCPs are attached here first and observed before they reach Workloads |
Two anti-patterns to avoid:
- An OU per team or department. Teams change names and owners; accounts then sit under the wrong policies. Use tags for ownership and OUs for policy.
- A deep tree (OU per product, then per environment, then per region). Depth multiplies attachment points, and every extra level is another place for a policy to hide. Two levels under Workloads (
Prod,NonProd) is enough for most banks.
How policies flow down
For the account payments-prod, the effective SCP is the intersection of what every level allows, minus anything any level denies: root, Workloads, Prod, and the account itself. That is why every node has at least one SCP attached (almost always the built-in FullAWSAccess, which allows everything). Detach it carelessly and you have created an allow-list that denies everything not named, as the lab proves in a test.
Remember the rules from Boundaries, SCPs, RCPs and resource policies:
- SCPs never grant permission. They set a ceiling.
- Explicit deny at any level wins.
- Neither SCPs nor RCPs affect the management account.
- SCPs do not restrict service-linked roles.
What problem the AWS service solves
| Need | Organizations feature | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| One bill and shared volume discounts | Consolidated billing | Savings Plans and Reserved Instance discounts can be shared across accounts, and sharing can be turned off per account |
| Create accounts by API | CreateAccount | Asynchronous; accounts get an OrganizationAccountAccessRole that the management account can assume |
| Group accounts and apply rules | OUs and policies | Policies attach to the root, an OU or an account; they require all features enabled |
| Let a service work across accounts | Trusted access | You enable it per service; the service then creates what it needs in member accounts |
| Hand administration to a member account | Delegated administrator | The security tooling account administers GuardDuty and others so people stay out of the management account |
| Label accounts | Tags on accounts | Ownership, cost centre, data classification; also usable in policies |
Limits and sharp edges (checked 2026-11-18)
| Item | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Accounts per organisation | 10 | Adjustable from the management account; new organisations may start lower |
| OU nesting | 5 levels under the root | One root per organisation |
| OUs per organisation | 2,000 | Rarely the constraint |
| SCPs attached per root, OU or account | 10 | Includes FullAWSAccess |
| RCPs attached per target | 5 | RCPFullAWSAccess counts as one |
| SCP size | 10,240 characters | Whitespace is not counted when saved from the console, but is counted when saved with the CLI or an SDK |
| RCP size | 5,120 characters | |
| Concurrent account creations | 5 | |
| Accounts closed per 30 days | 20 percent of member accounts or 250, whichever is higher, up to 1,000 | Not adjustable |
| Tags on a root, OU or account | 50 |
Source: Quotas and service limits for AWS Organizations. Re-check before you design anything near a limit.
Also remember: Organizations is a global service homed in us-east-1, which is why the CLI profile region matters for Service Quotas calls.
Microsoft / Azure comparison
| You know (Microsoft/Azure) | AWS equivalent | What's different |
|---|---|---|
| Tenant root management group | Organization root | The root is not an OU; policies on it reach every member account |
| Management group tree | OU tree | Five levels, like Azure's six |
| Azure Policy assignment at a scope | SCP/RCP/tag policy attachment to a node | SCPs are a pure ceiling; Azure Policy can also audit, modify and deploy |
| Subscription placed in a management group | Account placed in an OU | Moving an account changes inherited policies immediately |
| Owner role at tenant root | Management account administrators | Far fewer people should hold this than hold Tenant Root Owner in a typical Azure estate |
| Azure Lighthouse / delegated resource management | Delegated administrator and cross-account roles | AWS delegates per service, not a generic "manage my subscription" |
| Subscription vending (Terraform or Bicep) | CreateAccount plus a baseline stack, or Control Tower Account Factory | See Control Tower and landing zones |
Architecture
Harbourline Bank's target organisation (fictional IDs):
Notice what is not here: no custom SCP on the root. Guardrails go on OUs first. Once every OU has proven the baseline in practice, you may promote it to the root, but only deliberately and with a rollback plan.
The security-boundary view of who administers what:
Step-by-step implementation
Check the foundation
Confirm the organisation has all features (not just consolidated billing), that SCPs are enabled on the root, and note the root ID. Policies need all features.
Create the OUs
Create the top-level OUs from the table. Create Prod and NonProd under Workloads. Keep names short and stable: they appear in policies and scripts.
Create or move accounts into OUs
New accounts: CreateAccount with a unique e-mail distribution address, then move from the root into the right OU. Existing accounts (your sandbox): MoveAccount. Nothing but the management account should remain directly under the root.
Validate the design as a file first
Before attaching a single policy to a real OU, describe the intended tree in org/harbourline-org.json and run the validator in the lab. Fix every error. This is the "review the plan" step you would do with terraform plan.
Attach policies to the test OU first
Attach the baseline SCP to the Sandbox OU and test with a sandbox account. Only when that behaves do you attach it to Workloads, starting with NonProd.
Enable trusted access and delegate administration
For each security service (GuardDuty, Security Hub, Config, Access Analyzer), enable trusted access and register the security tooling account as delegated administrator. Lesson Centralised security tooling does this in detail.
Tag every account and OU
Owner, CostCentre, DataClassification, Environment. Tag policies (a later lesson) can then enforce spelling and allowed values.
Store the structure as code
Terraform or CDK in a repository with required reviews. The management account is changed by a pipeline role, not by hand.
AWS Console instructions
- Console → AWS Organizations → AWS accounts. Select Root, choose Actions → Create new to add an OU. Name it, optionally tag it.
- Select an account, choose Actions → Move, and pick the destination OU. The inherited SCPs change as soon as the move completes.
- Policies → Service control policies → Create policy to author an SCP. Choose Actions → Attach policy to attach it.
- Services (left menu) lists integrated services and whether trusted access is enabled. A service's own console usually has a "delegate administrator" setting.
- Settings shows the organisation ID, the management account and the features enabled.
AWS CLI
# The root ID: needed as the parent of top-level OUs
ROOT_ID=$(aws organizations list-roots --profile learn-management --query "Roots[0].Id" --output text)
# Create an OU under the root (repeat for Security, Infrastructure, Workloads, Suspended)
aws organizations create-organizational-unit --parent-id "$ROOT_ID" --name Sandbox \
--tags Key=Project,Value=cea-lab Key=Owner,Value=you --profile learn-management
# See the OUs under the root
aws organizations list-organizational-units-for-parent --parent-id "$ROOT_ID" \
--profile learn-management --query "OrganizationalUnits[].{Id:Id,Name:Name}" --output table
# Create a member account (asynchronous). The role name is the cross-account admin role in the new account.
aws organizations create-account --email aws-payments-dev@example.org --account-name payments-dev \
--role-name OrganizationAccountAccessRole --profile learn-management
# Poll until State is SUCCEEDED; the response contains AccountId
aws organizations list-create-account-status --states IN_PROGRESS SUCCEEDED FAILED --profile learn-management
# Move the account from the root into an OU
aws organizations move-account --account-id 123456789012 \
--source-parent-id "$ROOT_ID" --destination-parent-id ou-xxxx-xxxxxxxx --profile learn-management
# Which policies reach an account? Direct attachments (inherited ones are found by walking up the parents)
aws organizations list-policies-for-target --target-id 123456789012 --filter SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY \
--profile learn-management
# Trusted access and a delegated administrator for GuardDuty
aws organizations enable-aws-service-access --service-principal guardduty.amazonaws.com --profile learn-management
aws organizations register-delegated-administrator --account-id 333333333333 \
--service-principal guardduty.amazonaws.com --profile learn-management
aws organizations list-delegated-administrators --profile learn-managementSome services have their own "enable organisation integration" or "designate administrator" API that does the same thing and more (GuardDuty and Security Hub in particular). Follow the service's documentation for the exact call ⚠ VERIFY per service.
Infrastructure as Code
using Amazon.CDK;
using Amazon.CDK.AWS.Organizations;
using Constructs;
// Run from a pipeline role in the MANAGEMENT account. L1 constructs only;
// Compiled against Amazon.CDK.Lib 2.277.0, not deployed. ⚠ VERIFY property names if you use another version.
public class OrgStructureStack : Stack
{
public OrgStructureStack(Construct scope, string id, string rootId) : base(scope, id)
{
var ous = new Dictionary<string, CfnOrganizationalUnit>();
foreach (var name in new[] { "Security", "Infrastructure", "Workloads", "Sandbox", "Suspended" })
{
ous[name] = new CfnOrganizationalUnit(this, name + "Ou", new CfnOrganizationalUnitProps
{
Name = name,
ParentId = rootId
});
}
_ = new CfnOrganizationalUnit(this, "ProdOu", new CfnOrganizationalUnitProps
{
Name = "Prod",
ParentId = ous["Workloads"].AttrId
});
_ = new CfnOrganizationalUnit(this, "NonProdOu", new CfnOrganizationalUnitProps
{
Name = "NonProd",
ParentId = ous["Workloads"].AttrId
});
// Resolves to the stack's own Tags property otherwise (error CS0176).
Amazon.CDK.Tags.Of(this).Add("Project", "cea-lab");
}
}Complete code
Two programs. First, the organisation tree printer (SDK v4, compiles on .NET 10). It shows you what is really attached, which is the evidence you compare against your design file.
using Amazon.Organizations;
using Amazon.Organizations.Model;
// Print the organisation as a tree, with the SCPs attached directly to each node.
var org = new AmazonOrganizationsClient();
var root = (await org.ListRootsAsync(new ListRootsRequest())).Roots!.Single();
await PrintAsync(root.Id, root.Name, "root", 0);
return 0;
async Task PrintAsync(string id, string name, string kind, int depth)
{
var scps = await org.ListPoliciesForTargetAsync(new ListPoliciesForTargetRequest
{
TargetId = id,
Filter = PolicyType.SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY
});
var names = string.Join(", ", (scps.Policies ?? []).Select(p => p.Name));
Console.WriteLine($"{new string(' ', depth * 2)}{kind}: {name} ({id}) SCPs: [{names}]");
var accounts = await org.ListAccountsForParentAsync(new ListAccountsForParentRequest { ParentId = id });
foreach (var a in accounts.Accounts ?? [])
await PrintAsync(a.Id, a.Name, "account", depth + 1);
var ous = await org.ListOrganizationalUnitsForParentAsync(new ListOrganizationalUnitsForParentRequest { ParentId = id });
foreach (var ou in ous.OrganizationalUnits ?? [])
await PrintAsync(ou.Id, ou.Name, "ou", depth + 1);
}Second, the design validator in the lab: labs/m15-org-guardrails. It reads the tree from JSON, so you review a design before applying it. These are its rules:
| Code | Severity | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| HL-ORG-001 | Error | The four required top-level OUs exist |
| HL-ORG-002 | Error | Exactly one management account, directly under the root; no member account directly under the root |
| HL-ORG-003 | Error | OU nesting is at most five levels |
| HL-ORG-004 | Error | At most 10 SCPs on any target |
| HL-ORG-005 | Error | Every node has at least one SCP |
| HL-ORG-006 | Warning | A custom SCP on the root (prove it in an OU first) |
| HL-ORG-007 | Error | The Security OU holds a log archive and a security tooling account |
| HL-ORG-008 | Warning | An account's purpose matches its OU |
| HL-ORG-009 | Error | Every referenced policy exists |
| HL-ORG-010 | Error | Probe: an ordinary engineer role is denied the protected actions in every member account |
Run it:
dotnet run --project src/Harbourline.Governance.Tool -- validate org/harbourline-org.json policiesReal output against the shipped design:
[WARNING] HL-SCP-004 (scp-suspended-deny-all/SuspendedAccountDenyAll) Unconditional deny of every action. Only correct for a Suspended OU; anywhere else it locks the account.
OK: no errors (1 finding(s) in total).That warning is expected and correct: a deny-all policy is exactly what the Suspended OU needs. The validator tells you to double-check where it is attached.
Code explained line by line
Tree printer
ListRootsAsync(...).Roots!.Single()returns the one root.Single()throws if the organisation somehow has zero or more than one, which cannot happen today but documents the assumption.PrintAsyncis a local function that recurses. For each node it asks for the SCPs directly attached (ListPoliciesForTarget). Inherited policies are not listed, so to find the effective set you read the nodes on the path to the account.ListAccountsForParentandListOrganizationalUnitsForParentreturn a node's children. The loop prints accounts first, then OUs.?? []guards against SDK v4's null collections.- Each call is throttled per account, so for hundreds of nodes cache results or add delays.
Validator (lab)
OrgNode.PathFromRoot()builds the list from root to account. SCP evaluation is "walk this list".ScpEvaluator.Evaluatereturns early for the management account and for service-linked roles, then checks for an explicit Deny on every level, then requires an Allow on every level.OrgValidator.Validateruns the structure checks first and then, only if all policy names resolve, the probe: it evaluates five protected actions as an ordinary role in every member account. If any is allowed, HL-ORG-010 fires. This catches the classic mistake of building a lovely tree and forgetting to attach the guardrail.
Security considerations
⚠ Learning shortcut — not for production
In the lab you may attach guardrails by running Terraform from your laptop with the learn-management SSO profile. A bank would run organisation changes only from a pipeline role in the management account, after a pull request with two approvers, and would alert on every AttachPolicy, DetachPolicy, MoveAccount and CreateAccount call. The shortcut also hides the fact that your sandbox has exactly one human who can break everything.
- Moving an account is a security change.
MoveAccountchanges the policies that apply to it instantly. Treat it as privileged and monitor it. - Protect the SCPs themselves. Only management-account principals can edit them, so keep that group tiny. There is no way to protect the management account with an SCP.
- Break-glass. Define one named emergency role in each account, excluded in the guardrail by
aws:PrincipalArn, with MFA, alerting and a documented use procedure. - Root credentials. Member accounts do not need root passwords for day-to-day work. AWS offers centralised root access management for member accounts in an organisation ⚠ VERIFY current capabilities; adopt it so there is no long-lived root credential to steal.
- Delegated administrators widen the blast radius of the delegate. The security tooling account can now configure security services across all accounts. Treat it as tier-0: few humans, strong MFA, no workloads.
- Do not claim compliance. A tidy OU tree is a design control. It does not make you PCI DSS compliant or UK GDPR compliant; the legal, compliance and risk teams and (for cards) the assessor decide that.
Banking use case
When Harbourline acquires a small fintech, its AWS accounts are invited into the organisation. The runbook:
- Place the accounts in a quarantine OU (a child of Sandbox or Policy Staging) with a deny-by-default SCP so nothing changes while the security team reviews.
- Check
OrganizationAccountAccessRoledoes not exist (invited accounts do not get it) and add a controlled access path through IAM Identity Center. - Run the same inventory, baseline and logging checks.
- Only then move accounts into Workloads/NonProd, then Prod, one at a time.
The OU tree is what makes this boring: the place an account is moved to decides which guardrails it gets, so the migration team does not need to hand-apply controls.
Common mistakes
- Attaching a custom SCP to the root first. One typo then affects every member account. Prove it in Sandbox, then NonProd, then Prod.
- Detaching
FullAWSAccesswithout replacing it. You have switched from a deny list to an allow list and will break everything not listed. - An OU per team. Reorganisations then become account moves. Use tags.
- Forgetting that SCPs do not reach the management account, then putting a "temporary" workload there.
- Putting member accounts directly under the root. Only root-level policies reach them. Always use an OU.
- Treating
OrganizationAccountAccessRoleas your human access path. It exists for bootstrap and break-glass. Use Identity Center permission sets for people. - Creating accounts with a personal e-mail. The address controls root recovery.
Troubleshooting
| Symptom | Likely cause | Fix |
|---|---|---|
PolicyTypeNotEnabledException on attach | SCPs not enabled on the root | aws organizations enable-policy-type --root-id r-xxxx --policy-type SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY |
DuplicateOrganizationalUnitException | An OU with that name already exists under the parent | List the OUs and reuse or rename |
ConstraintViolationException on DetachPolicy | It is the last SCP on that target | Attach another SCP first (usually FullAWSAccess) |
AccessDeniedException: You don't have permissions to access this resource after attaching an SCP | The SCP is denying the very action you are calling | Test with a separate break-glass role; detach the policy from the target from the management account |
CreateAccount stays IN_PROGRESS | Normal for a few minutes | Poll describe-create-account-status; max five concurrent |
OrganizationAccountAccessRole missing | The account was invited, not created | Create a cross-account role manually in that account |
| Account cannot be removed from the organisation | It lacks the information required to leave standalone (payment method, support plan) or is too new ("minimum age for removal of created accounts") | Add the missing information or wait; ⚠ VERIFY current constraints |
Cost and cleanup
Cost: free. Organizations, OUs, SCPs and the CLI calls have no charge. Creating accounts is free too, but each account you create can start accruing charges the moment you deploy anything into it.
# Remove empty OUs you created for practice (an OU must be empty first)
aws organizations list-accounts-for-parent --parent-id ou-xxxx-xxxxxxxx --profile learn-management
aws organizations delete-organizational-unit --organizational-unit-id ou-xxxx-xxxxxxxx --profile learn-management
# If you used Terraform from the lab
cd labs/m15-org-guardrails/infra/terraform
terraform destroy -var owner=you -var root_id=r-xxxx
# Check that no lab-tagged resources remain in the sandbox account
aws resourcegroupstaggingapi get-resources --tag-filters Key=Project,Values=cea-lab \
--profile learn-sandbox --region us-east-1 --query "ResourceTagMappingList[].ResourceARN"Exercises
- 🟢 Guided: Copy
labs/m15-org-guardrails/org/harbourline-org.json, remove thelog-archiveaccount, and runvalidate. Read the error. Put it back. Then add aProdaccount directly under the root and read that error. - 🟡 Challenge: Add a
Policy StagingOU to the file with one test account. Attachscp-baseline-protectto it only. Write the order in which you would promote the policy to NonProd, Prod and finally the root, and what you would watch at each stage. - 🔴 Live problem: "Engineering wants an OU per squad (14 squads). Security says no." Mediate. Produce a one-page proposal that gives squads what they actually need (cost visibility, access separation, ownership) without 14 OUs.
Assignment
Add docs/organisation-design.md to your portfolio repository with: the OU tree as a Mermaid diagram, a table of what each OU is for and which SCPs apply, the management-account rules, the delegated-administrator plan, and the output of hl-org validate for your design.
Solutions
Removing log-archive fires HL-ORG-007 ("The Security OU has no 'log-archive' account"). Adding a member Prod account directly under the root fires HL-ORG-002 ("A member account sits directly under the root, where only root-level SCPs reach it") and HL-ORG-008 may fire too, since a workload account is not in Workloads. The point: the file captures the design rules, so reviewers catch these in a pull request, not in an audit.
Add {"id":"ou-hl01-staging","name":"Policy Staging","kind":"ou","policies":["FullAWSAccess","scp-baseline-protect"],"children":[ ... a test account ... ]}. Promotion order: Policy Staging (a week, watch CloudTrail for AccessDenied and errorCode counts), Sandbox, Workloads/NonProd (two weeks), Workloads/Prod (change window, rollback plan: detach the policy, which is immediate), Security and Infrastructure, and only last the root, if at all. Many banks never attach custom SCPs to the root, keeping it at FullAWSAccess and using OU-level policies. HL-ORG-006 will warn you if you do.
Give squads: a tag Squad=<name> enforced by tag policy, cost reports grouped by that tag (cost allocation tags must be activated), one account per squad per environment under the shared Prod and NonProd OUs, and IAM Identity Center groups per squad so access is separate. The OU stays a policy grouping. Security's real concern is policy sprawl: 14 OUs means 14 places to attach and review guardrails. Offer a rule: a new OU needs a policy difference that cannot be expressed on an existing one.
Knowledge check
Answer: Only policies attached to the root and to the account itself. That is why every member account belongs in an OU: OUs are where targeted guardrails are attached.
Answer: Nothing is allowed. SCPs are a ceiling, and with no Allow at that level the ceiling is zero. (In practice AWS refuses to detach the last SCP from a target.) Replace the policy, do not just remove it.
Answer: The management account. SCPs also do not restrict service-linked roles.
Answer: It keeps day-to-day security work and its permissions out of the most powerful account, and applies least privilege: the security team gets rights over security services only, not over the whole organisation.
Answer: Usually not. Departments reorganise; accounts then sit under the wrong policies. OUs should express policy and ownership differences that are stable, such as Security, Workloads and Sandbox, with tags for departments.
Interview questions
- What should and should not run in the management account? Only billing, Organizations and (initially) Identity Center administration. No workloads, no routine engineering access, because SCPs and RCPs do not restrict it and it controls the organisation.
- How do you roll out a new SCP safely? Lint it, test it against a policy staging account, attach to Sandbox, then NonProd, then Prod, watching CloudTrail for denials, with a documented rollback (detach). Avoid the root until proven.
- How would you onboard an acquired company's accounts? Invite them, land them in a quarantine OU with a deny-by-default policy, review and baseline, then move them in stages.
- How do you keep the organisation structure reviewable? Keep it as code in Git, validate it in CI, and run an inventory job that compares reality with the file.
Certification practice
A security engineer attaches a new SCP to the organisation root that denies ec2:* outside two approved Regions. Developers in a member account immediately report that CloudFront and IAM operations also fail. What is the most likely cause?
A) SCPs cannot use the aws:RequestedRegion condition.
B) The policy denies Action: "*" for requests outside the approved Regions, including global services.
C) CloudFront is not covered by Organizations.
D) The management account is not exempt from SCPs.
Answer: B. A Region deny must use NotAction to exempt global-service actions (IAM, CloudFront, Route 53, billing and so on), or it also blocks them. A is false: the condition is the standard approach. C is false. D is the reverse of the truth: the management account is exempt.
A bank wants to apply stricter guardrails to production accounts than to development accounts, and to freeze a closed account while keeping its evidence. Which structure meets both needs with the least operational overhead?
A) One OU with SCPs that check an Environment tag on each request.
B) Separate OUs for Prod and NonProd, plus a Suspended OU with a deny-all SCP.
C) One account per OU, each with its own organisation.
D) Use IAM permission boundaries only.
Answer: B. OUs target policy by location, and moving an account into Suspended applies a deny-all immediately. A is fragile (tags can be missing or wrong on a request). C creates separate organisations, losing central governance and billing. D cannot restrict the account's root user or apply to accounts centrally.
After moving an account to a different OU, an operator can no longer call an API that worked before. What should they check first?
A) The account's IAM users for expired passwords. B) The SCPs and RCPs attached to the new OU and its parents. C) The CloudWatch alarms in the account. D) The Cost Explorer filters.
Answer: B. Moving an account changes which policies it inherits. The CloudTrail AccessDenied message usually indicates an explicit deny in a service control policy.
Completion checklist
- I can draw the Harbourline OU tree and justify each OU by policy difference
- I know what only the management account can do, and what must never run there
- I ran
hl-org validateand understood every finding - I can explain why
FullAWSAccessstays attached - I ran the cleanup and confirmed nothing is still billing
Key takeaways
- OUs express policy and ownership differences. Tags carry team names.
- Every member account sits in an OU; the management account stays nearly empty.
- Effective permissions are the intersection of every level; one deny anywhere wins.
- Prove guardrails in a test OU first; the root is the last place for a custom SCP.
- Keep the structure as code and validate it before applying.
Further reading
- Quotas and service limits for AWS Organizations
- Creating a trail for an organization (a worked example of trusted access)
- Organizing your AWS environment using multiple accounts
- Next: AWS Control Tower and landing zones
Independent learning resource — not affiliated with, endorsed or sponsored by Amazon Web Services. AWS and related marks are trademarks of Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All banking data in examples is fictional. Sample architectures are for learning and are not automatically compliant with GDPR, PCI DSS or any banking regulation.
Why a bank uses many AWS accounts
Decide when to split workloads into separate AWS accounts, justify each split with blast radius, segregation of duties, quotas, data scope and cost, and write the decision down so an auditor can follow it.
AWS Control Tower and landing zones: build it, buy it or start lighter
Understand what AWS Control Tower creates in your organisation, how its controls and Account Factory work, what it costs, and how to decide between Control Tower, a lite landing zone built as code, or a mix of both.